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
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**A Study of North Korean and  
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the United Nations**

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Project POWOW  
Technical Memorandum ORO-T-42 (FEC)  
Received: 16 February 1954

**A Study of North Korean and  
Chinese Soldier Attitudes Toward  
Communism, Democracy, and  
the United Nations**

*by*

Julius Segal



**OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE**  
The Johns Hopkins University Chevy Chase, Maryland

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## **PREFACE**

Over two years have passed since the data for this study were gathered in Korea. For this reason (and because the Korean War has ended), the findings relative to North Korean (NK) and Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) attitudes are of no operational value at the present time. The importance of this type of research lies in its development and application of instruments and techniques for assessing target vulnerabilities. This study presents a series of attitude tests and a methodology that can be adapted for use with future targets when the ideological vulnerabilities of a particular group are sought.

The lapse of time between the gathering of the data\* and the publication of this report was occasioned by numerous factors including study priorities, experimental analyses of the data, etc. Therefore, the time consumed in completing the present study should be understood to be in no way indicative of the length of time it will take to complete studies of this type in future operations. Given the availability of necessary facilities, the core results of this type of study could be obtained in approximately three to four weeks.

The question who will do this type of target assessment study as a matter of routine for future operations is one for the Army ultimately to decide. There appear to be three alternatives: research personnel from Army-sponsored agencies such as ORO; research teams composed of civilians selected from university staffs; and qualified military personnel assigned to Army psychological warfare units with this type of research function as their major responsibility.

\*The data for this study were collected by Lessing A. Kahn, assisted by a field team; the author is responsible for the analysis of the data and the writing of this report.

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## SUMMARY

### PROBLEM

To determine psychological vulnerabilities of specific target audiences through the use of scales measuring attitudes toward communism, democracy, and the United Nations.

### FACTS

In planning psychological warfare operations, recognition has been taken of the importance of capitalizing on the tactical-military situation and other environmental factors in order to increase the effectiveness of our propaganda. In this connection, intelligence data have been utilized in order to indicate the most vulnerable targets to be attacked and the most telling messages to be utilized. There is, however, an as yet unfulfilled need for establishing reliable and valid methods whereby purely psychological vulnerabilities of the enemy may be assessed readily in order, again, to direct and tailor our psywar in a maximally effective way.

Through the development and application of attitude scales measuring facets of morale, data can be provided for use in both psywar and prisoner of war education operations. For psywar purposes, these data serve to indicate the most vulnerable segments of a target audience, and the types of themes that might best be utilized. For purposes of reorientation and education of POWs, the utilization of attitude scale data makes possible the selection of those prisoners who would be most amenable to indoctrination, the grouping together for instruction purposes of those prisoners whose attitudes are similar in nature and degree, and the evaluation of indoctrination effectiveness by periodic follow-up assessments of prisoner attitudes.

### DISCUSSION

This report represents one of a series of ORO studies\* designed to analyze the psychological vulnerabilities of enemy targets in Korea through the study of various facets of enemy morale. Toward this end, ORO investigators have, in

\*Operations Research Office, "A Study of North Korean and Chinese Soldiers' Attitudes Toward the Korean War," ORO-T-34(FEC), Oct 1953. CONFIDENTIAL, and "Psychological Warfare and Other Factors Affecting the Surrender of North Korean and Chinese Forces," ORO-T-40(FEC), Sep 1953, CONFIDENTIAL.

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this study, developed, applied, and tested psychological instruments for evaluating attitudes toward three political ideologies: communism, democracy, and the UN. The total sample studied numbered 5101 prisoners, 1919 Chinese and 3182 North Koreans. The study was completed twice in its entirety, once in March and again in September of 1951. Since different samples of prisoners were used in each case, it was possible to make two independent applications of the instruments and techniques utilized.

The findings reported relative to the specific attitudes of the CCF and NK prisoners tested are, of course, of no operational significance in Korea at the present time because the shooting war has ended. Were the fighting to resume, the applicability of these substantive findings would have to be determined, as in the case of all research, by indications of later evidence. However, the instruments, methods, and techniques tested here are, irrespective of the time lag, of current and lasting importance in that they may be reused for the same audiences if and when the opportunity arises, and may be adapted for use with other possible targets. The substantive findings of this study are presented primarily as indications of how the methods employed here may be utilized, with the conclusions and recommendations given in the present tense as if they were of immediate applicability. They should be considered as typical of the kinds of conclusions and recommendations that studies of this type can yield in the future.

The data were analyzed separately for the samples of March and September and, in each case, separately for officers and enlisted men. These analyses may be regarded as of two types, one dealing specifically with method, and the other with the assessment of attitudes. The methodological analyses include (a) an analysis of each item of the questionnaire in terms of its utility, or validity, in measuring the attitudes under study; (b) an analysis of the reliability of the scales, i.e., the consistency or stability with which results could be expected for similar groups under similar conditions; (c) a determination of the validity of the scales, i.e., the degree to which the scales measure those attitudes which they were designed to measure; (d) the scoring of responses to individual questionnaire items and the derivation of total scores for each scale; (e) the differentiation of attitudes from a knowledge of questionnaire scale scores; and (f) the differentiation of attitudes toward specific issues presented by the items of the questionnaire.

The attitude analyses include (a) a comparison of the samples with respect to the attitudes tested; (b) a comparison of the attitudes among subgroups within each sample who differ with regard to pertinent background characteristics such as time in combat, training, etc.; (c) a comparison of the samples of March and September; and (d) a study of the responses made by each sample to particular issues posed by the questionnaire items.

The methodological and attitudinal analyses described above will be found, for the most part, in separate sections of the report. However, the interdependence of method and substance demands, in some instances, that they be presented together. Basic data for this report are found in the appendices.

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## CONCLUSIONS

### Methodology

1. The questionnaire scales developed here to measure attitudes toward communism, democracy, and the United Nations are more than adequate in terms of their reliability.
2. These scales yield meaningful and valid estimates of attitudes toward communism, democracy, and the UN among POW samples.
3. The administration of attitude scales appears to be entirely feasible under field conditions.

### Enemy Attitudes

4. Of the samples studied, the Chinese officers (CCF - O) hold attitudes least favorable to communism and most favorable to democracy and the UN, with the Chinese enlisted men (CCF - EM), North Korean enlisted men (NK - EM), and North Korean officers (NK - Os) following in that order.
5. The NK - Os represent, as a whole, a hard-core target of strong, pro-communist ideological orientation with marked anti-UN and democratic attitudes.
6. A small percentage (4 to 5 percent) of the NK - Os appears to be atypical of the NK - O group as a whole in that their attitudes are unfavorable to communism and favorable to democracy and the UN. In terms of their background, these prisoners are found to differ from the large majority of NK - Os only in that they are predominantly members of logistical, or noncombat, units.
7. Among the CCF, little differences in attitudes are found for subgroups differing in background characteristics such as combat, training, etc. This is probably due to their relatively homogenous status as professional soldiers.
8. Among the NK - EM, and somewhat so among the NK - Os, favorable communist attitudes and unfavorable UN and democratic attitudes increase with increased combat experience until 5 to 6 months of combat are experienced, following which there is a reversal in attitudes; those segments of the NK forces with very long periods of combat as well as those with little or no combat at all appear, therefore, to be the most amenable to ideologically oriented UN propaganda.
9. Among the NK - EM, increasingly more favorable attitudes toward communism and less favorable attitudes toward democracy and the UN are found for groups with longer time in the army and longer periods of training. This may be a reflection of the intensive indoctrination program conducted by the Communist leaders of the NK armies, or, possibly, of the fact that the known hard-core segments were the first to be inducted. When the mission of psywar is to influence the ideological orientation of the enemy, its greatest chances of success will be among NK - EM who are relatively new recruits.
10. Among the NK - EM, attitudes toward the UN are significantly more favorable among the September sample than among the March sample; this

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may be the result of UN-sponsored propaganda counteracting the biased view of the UN given by NK Communist leaders.

11. Among the CCF-EM, increased knowledge of the UN is associated with more favorable attitudes toward democracy and unfavorable attitudes toward communism.

12. Among the NK in the March sample (both officers and EM), increased knowledge of the UN is associated with more favorable attitudes toward communism and unfavorable attitudes toward democracy; for the NK-EM, this is reversed in the September sample; i.e., increased knowledge of the UN is associated with less favorable attitudes toward communism and more favorable attitudes toward democracy. This reversal may be explained by the effects of UN propaganda acting as an antidote to "knowledge of the UN" learned from communist indoctrination.

13. Among the CCF, those with longer periods of education express attitudes more favorable to the UN and democracy and less favorable to communism; among the North Koreans, the opposite obtains, i.e., increased education is related to more favorable attitudes toward communism and unfavorable attitudes toward democracy and the UN. This finding reflects the strong element of communist indoctrination in the "education" of the NK forces, as well as the fact that the strongly pro-communist officers are those with predominantly longer periods of education.

14. Among both the CCF and NK, those prisoners who were captured express attitudes more favorable to communism and unfavorable to the UN and democracy than those who surrendered; this is most marked for the NK-EM.

15. No consistent differences in attitudes are found for POWs differing in length of imprisonment, reflecting the elimination from the samples of those POWs subjected to reeducation procedures.

16. Of the specific issues presented by the questionnaire items, the following were answered most favorably in UN terms:

- (a) The UN is the hope and salvation of humankind. (NK-EM)
- (b) The UN is the only organization capable of checking aggression. (NK-EM)
- (c) The American type of democracy is the best form of government ever devised. (CCF-EM)
- (d) Since the American type of democracy respects the will of the majority, it gives great happiness to its people. (CCF-Os and EM, NK-EM)
- (e) In the American type of democracy, everyone can enjoy freedom of speech. (CCF-Os and EM, NK-EM)
- (f) The American type of democratic nations are devoted to peaceful settlement of all world problems. (NK-EM)
- (g) The working class in a communist state leads a miserable slave life. (CCF-Os and EM)
- (h) American democracy is not an ideology of aggression. (CCF-Os)

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21 October 1954

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3. The instruments, methods, and techniques tested in this study are of current and lasting importance in that, with refinements, they may be reused for the same audience if and when the opportunity arises and adapted for use with other possible targets.

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Major General, GS  
Deputy ACofS, G-3 for Research,  
Requirements and Special Weapons

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## RECOMMENDATIONS

### Methodology

1. The questionnaire scales developed here to measure attitudes toward communism, democracy, and the UN should be used in the reassessment of NK and CCF attitudes if the opportunity arises, and adapted for the assessment of vulnerabilities of other possible targets.

### Enemy Attitudes

2. In psywar operations in Korea designed to affect enemy attitudes toward communism, democracy, and the UN, recognition should be given to the following order of vulnerabilities: CCF-Os, CCF-EM, NK-EM, and NK-Os.

3. Among the NK-EM forces, the subgroups that should be recognized as the most vulnerable are those with the least army service and training, and those with either a minimum or a maximum of combat experience.

4. The NK-Os should be the subject of intensive study as a group typical of hard-core targets with strongly pro-communist orientation.

5. Propaganda designed to educate the enemy with respect to the UN should be stressed as an antidote to enemy indoctrination and misinformation concerning UN ideals, purposes, etc.

6. The following items should be considered as idea-nuclei for themes in ideological propaganda.

(a) The UN as the hope and salvation of mankind (CCF-Os and EM, NK-EM), and as the only organization capable of checking aggression (NK-EM);

(b) Democracy as respecting the will of the majority, giving great happiness to its people, and providing freedom of speech (CCF-Os and EM, NK-EM); as the best form of government ever devised (CCF-EM); as an ideology of nonaggression (CCF-Os); as devoted to the peaceful settlement of the world's problems (NK-EM); and

(c) Communism as a state in which the working class leads a miserable slave life. (CCF-Os and EM)

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## A STUDY OF NORTH KOREAN AND CHINESE SOLDIER ATTITUDES TOWARD COMMUNISM, DEMOCRACY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

### ASSESSING TARGET ATTITUDES

The rationale underlying the assessment of enemy soldier attitudes has two aspects: the first for psychological warfare purposes, and the second for information and reorientation of the POW.

#### Psychological Warfare Purposes

In order to utilize psychological warfare resources efficiently, it is necessary to define the nature of the various target audiences in terms of their vulnerability to psychological warfare media. In this connection it is essential to gather data on the strength of existing attitudes among various segments of enemy troops. The hypothesis underlying this type of attitude study is that those targets who give evidence of the weakest group-identification (i.e., most unfavorable attitudes toward communism and most favorable attitudes toward democracy and the UN) are those who are most vulnerable to psychological attack, and therefore those who should be hit the hardest in a psywar effort dealing with ideological propaganda. Here a parallel may be drawn with a basic principle of military tactics. The heaviest concentration of military resources is put to bear on that segment of the enemy line which, it is believed, will offer the least resistance; that is, the attack is made where chances of success are greatest. It is recognized, of course, that particular goals and aims with respect to the targets studied may, in the future, dictate against such a procedure; for example, it may be deemed most valuable to attack a hard-core group for the sake of changing the orientation of but a few of the enemy. In any case, regardless of which segment of a target group one may wish to attack, it is well to know the intensity and direction of its ideological orientation.

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Data on enemy attitudes are useful also in determining what types of themes might best be incorporated into psychological warfare materials. This is comparable to the use of military intelligence in choosing the types of weapons to be utilized in order to assure the success of a military operation. Heavy artillery, for example, would not ordinarily be employed against a scattered group of enemy snipers. In the area of psychological warfare it would be entirely wasteful to bombard a target with messages describing the comforts of UN prison life when, in fact, the troops are already convinced that the UN offers humane treatment of prisoners. When the attitudes of enemy target groups are known, psychological warfare operators may utilize such data as one criterion for using specific types of messages.

### POW Indoctrination and Reorientation Purposes

In order to apply information and reorientation efforts efficiently, it is necessary to define the nature of the prisoner population in terms of amenability, or vulnerability, to such a program. Just as in the case of target audience choice for psychological warfare purposes, data on the strength of existing attitudes among prisoners provide a criterion for selecting prisoners for indoctrination. It would be uneconomical to attempt to indoctrinate enemy troops at random with no a priori estimate of the strength of their existing attitudes; the success of such a program is more likely when the indoctrination audience is screened on the basis of existing attitudes.

Again in order to organize a reorientation program efficiently, some selection device is necessary to make it possible to group together for instruction those prisoners whose attitudes are similar in nature and degree. Data on enemy soldier attitudes may be utilized for this purpose in order to insure a homogeneity of POW personnel selected for specific areas of indoctrination.

The effectiveness of specific indoctrination programs may be evaluated by measuring changes in attitudes attributable to reeducation efforts. In this connection, a follow-up assessment of attitudes may be made after a period of reorientation.

With the foregoing rationale in mind, ORO has undertaken a series of studies\* designed to assess various facets of enemy morale. This study concerns itself with attitudes among CCF and NK forces toward three political ideologies: communism, democracy, and the UN. Because of the lapse of time between the collection of these data in 1951 and the present, the applicability of the findings of this study relative to CCF and NK attitudes must be determined, as in the case of all research, by a knowledge of additional and later evidence. However, these findings are presented here primarily as indications of how the instruments, methods, and techniques applied in the study may be reutilized for the same audiences should the opportunity arise, and adapted for use with other possible targets. For this reason the report deals separately with methodology on the one hand, and substantive findings on the

\*Op. cit.

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other, although the two are sometimes functionally related. The basic data are reported in the appendices.

## SOURCES OF THE DATA

### Samples

Samples of NK and CCF POWs were tested in March and September of 1951. The over-all total of prisoners samples was 5101, distributed as indicated in Table 1.

TABLE 1

#### DISTRIBUTION OF POWs STUDIED

Rank	Chinese		North Korean		Total
	Mar	Sep	Mar	Sep	
O	73	230	329	530	1162
EM	735	881	964	1359	3939
Total	808	1111	1293	1889	5101

It will be noted that the sizes of these samples are quite large, comparing favorably with those generally used in present day social survey research. In public opinion polling, samples of about 5000 to 10,000 are used to represent the entire US population. In the present study, the March CCF sample was made up of 30 percent of the enlisted men and 40 percent of the officers then comprising the total Chinese POW population. It is clear that in point of size, the samples of this investigation are more than adequate for drawing inferences about the parent POW and active army populations from which they were drawn.

Since comprehensive statistical data describing the prisoner and army populations are not available, it is impossible to make any detailed comparisons between the samples used in this study and those from which they were drawn. Nevertheless, even considering the limiting conditions of field investigation, the samples were as systematically selected as possible. A successful effort was made to eliminate the introduction of any bias which would distort the composition of the samples in any significant way. Steps taken in this connection included the following:

(a) The selection of prisoners was made from as large a number of prison camps as possible within the framework of the study, thus eliminating possible biases occasioned by the treatment, organization, and other situational

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factors unique for those prisoners of a given camp. The camps from which the samples were drawn included those in the Pusan area and Koje Island.

(b) Excluded from the sample were those prisoners who were hospitalized or physically handicapped, since their attitudes may have been affected to a considerable extent by the preferential treatment accorded them as wounded men.

(c) The samples were carefully screened in order to ensure that they were composed solely of members of the enemy military forces under consideration. Thus, all civilians, e.g., refugees, political prisoners, etc., were eliminated from the samples.

(d) Those in punitive confinement or protective custody were excluded; here again, the possible bias introduced by atypical treatment of POWs was avoided.

(e) No prisoners who had been subjected to extensive reorientation influences of the US Army Information and Education Program were included. The original attitudes of such POWs may be expected to have been considerably confounded by their subsequent indoctrination experiences.

(f) As a result of thorough screening, it was made certain that no members of the March sample were again included in the September sample. Thus, inter-sample comparisons are rendered free of any bias which would have been occasioned if the samples were, in fact, not mutually exclusive.

In summary, the large size of the samples of this investigation and the systematic elimination of biases from their composition provide a sound basis from which to extrapolate the findings of this investigation to the parent populations from which the samples were derived.

Appendix A presents comprehensive data describing the samples in terms of pertinent background characteristics.

### THE QUESTIONNAIRE

A series of 900 statements expressing various attitudes toward communism, democracy, and the UN were initially prepared by a group of South Koreans, all of whom were members of various professions, mainly educators affiliated with the National University of Seoul, Korea. The entire group had been briefed on the principles of attitude item writing by the investigator in charge. By inspection, 600 items were discarded as manifestly unsuitable. The remaining 300 items were considered to have some potential utility for scale purposes; they were therefore rephrased and then carefully reexamined. Only the best items in terms of usability for each scale were retained. As a result of this second purging, 125 items remained; these consisted of 40 items dealing with communism, 50 items dealing with democracy, and 35 with UN. Hereafter, the

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three scales will be referred to as C (Communism), D (Democracy), and U (United Nations), and the entire questionnaire as the CDU Questionnaire.

A third and final reexamination of the list of items was made for the purpose of selecting those which appeared to have maximum validity for scale measurements. Duplicate items were eliminated, and those which were retained presented a maximum coverage of content for each scale. The numbers of items retained for inclusion in the scales were: C Scale, 15; D Scale, 15; U Scale 10. The items were arranged in the questionnaire in random order, and scattered among them were ten "dummy" items, unrelated in content to those of the three scales; these were included in order to prevent the stereotyping of responses and the detection by the respondents of the exact purposes of the investigation. In analyzing the data, the three scales were, of course, treated separately. In addition to the CDU Questionnaire, each respondent completed a questionnaire dealing with pertinent personal background data. The complete questionnaire as presented to the respondents is reproduced in Appendix B.

Following the administration of the questionnaire, the responses by the samples to the CDU scales were statistically analyzed for the purpose of selecting only the most valid items for each scale. Each item was tested for its ability to discriminate between the prisoners with favorable and unfavorable attitudes (high and low scores) for a given scale. (See section, "Item Analyses" below.) This analysis led to the elimination of two items from each scale for each sample. Thus, the final scales used in analyzing the data contained a total of 44 items; C Scale, 13; D Scale, 13; U Scale, 8. The items eliminated are indicated by an asterisk in the questionnaire presented in Appendix B.

### INTERVIEWERS

The field teams were composed of native Korean and Chinese interviewers working under American supervision. Seventeen interviewers were used in March, and 19 in September; the selection was made from a large number of applicants on the basis of standard personnel-form information and individual interviews. The members of the final teams were well qualified in terms of education, language facility, and general over-all competence. Among those selected were teachers, students, accountants, businessmen, and representatives of other occupations judged to qualify those chosen as interviewers. With only a few exceptions, all members of the group spoke Chinese, Korean, and Japanese fluently, and they were familiar with variations of dialect; each interviewer also had a good working knowledge of English.

A 10-day training period for interviewers was given before the actual administration of questionnaires was begun; during this period the interviewers familiarized themselves thoroughly with all of the materials of the study as well as with the procedures to be employed. At the conclusion of the training period, the interviewers were organized into tent-teams of three members each. (One team in March was composed of only two interviewers.) Within each

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team a leader was chosen, and one interviewer supervised the work of all the groups.

### ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

The procedures employed in gathering the data of this investigation were essentially similar in March and September; therefore the description which follows is applicable to both samples.

Before the actual administration of the questionnaire was undertaken, it was necessary to ensure the fullest cooperation of the POW respondents; therefore, each prison camp spokesman was initially briefed about the general procedure of the investigation. For the purposes of ease of administration, the samples were divided into groups of from 40 to 50 POWs each, with the officers and enlisted men in separate groups. Tents large enough to accommodate groups of this size comfortably were used for administering the questionnaires.

After the test groups had been assembled in their respective tents, each tent leader read a series of general instructions (Appendix B), and offered to answer questions from the respondents on the procedure to be followed. The first questionnaire administered was one dealing with background data. While the leader read each question and all possible answers aloud (thus overcoming the problem of illiteracy), the remaining members of the tent-team acted as proctors, answering all procedural questions by the respondents. The prisoners were urged to answer all the items and were assured that their responses would not be used for identification purposes.

Following the completion of the questionnaire on background data the CDU Questionnaire was administered. This was introduced by special instructions on the manner in which the items were to be answered. For each item the prisoners had a choice of five responses: Strongly Agree, Agree, Undecided, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree. A large board reproducing the five response categories was shown and read to the POWs, and a standard example was presented for demonstration purposes. During the actual administration, the board was retained in view, and the five possible answers were reread with each new page of the questionnaire. As in the case of the background data questionnaire each item was read aloud in order to enable the illiterate POWs to respond. No suggestions were made for the respondents to guess at the most appropriate answer. The prisoners were told that if, for any given item, they had no opinions or could not make up their minds about their responses, the answer marked "Undecided" was to be used.

After the completion of the questionnaires, the prisoners were asked for their comments about the task; their responses indicated a high degree of interest and a minimum of boredom and fatigue. There was also general agreement among the members of the field teams that the respondents regarded their task seriously and with a high degree of motivation. The total time consumed in administration was 1 hour for the background data questionnaire and  $\frac{1}{2}$  hour for the CDU Questionnaire. The procedure included the administration of further questionnaires, the results of which are given in separate reports. The use of such a series proved to be entirely feasible with respect to time and test tolerance.

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## METHODOLOGICAL ANALYSES OF THE DATA

### Scoring of CDU Questionnaire Items

As described in the previous section, respondents were required to answer each of the questionnaire items with one of five possible responses. Numbers ranging from "1" to "5" were assigned to these responses in the manner described by the sample item below:

Item:	Communism is the realization of the hopes of mankind.				
Response:	1	2	3	4	5
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree

It will be noted that a low score, i.e., "1" or "2," indicates a response unfavorable to the issue presented, and that a high score, i.e., "4" or "5," indicates a response favorable to that issue. The middle, or "Undecided," response category (score "3") indicates a neutral attitude toward the issue. Irrespective of the phrasing of the items, the same scoring system was applied to all items of the CDU Questionnaire so that a response favorable to the issue presented was always given a high value.

### Scoring of CDU Questionnaire Scales

Although this study concerns itself in part with analyses of the responses by prisoner samples to individual items (attitudes toward specific issues), the major portion of the analyses deal with the responses to the questionnaire scales as a whole (attitudes toward communism, democracy, and the UN). In order to arrive at a total score for any given scale (for example, the 13 items comprising the C Scale), the prisoners' scores for the individual items were simply added. In this way, a score defining attitudes toward communism, for example, was derived from 13 individual "attitudes," each of them dealing with a phase of the whole. Similarly, total scores were derived by summing the 13 items of the D Scale and the 8 items of the U Scale.

### Qualitative Differentiation of Attitudes from Total Scores

In order to define the strength of attitudes from a knowledge of questionnaire scale scores, a system of scale step intervals was used. This system involves the transformation of the item response intervals into response intervals for a scale as a whole; this is presented graphically in Fig. 1.

For items, a scale step is simply the unit interval between responses, e.g., between "1" and "2," or "Strongly Disagree" and "Disagree." In terms of total scores, a scale step becomes the unit interval between item responses multiplied by the number of items for a given scale.



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It will be seen from Fig. 1 that if a respondent had checked response "1" on each item of the 13-item C Scale, his total score would obviously be 13; if he responded by checking "5" for all items, his total score would be 65. For the 13-item D Scale, the same range of scores applies. The U Scale, having eight items, has a possible score range from 8 (all items answered "1") to 40 (all items answered "5"). Intermediate total scores could be obtained by various combinations of item scores on any scale.

	SCALE STEP INTERVALS				
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
Item Scores	1	2	3	4	5
Scale Scores					
D Scale	13	26	39	52	65
C Scale	13	26	39	52	65
U Scale	8	16	24	32	40

Fig. 1—Scale Step Intervals for Item and Total Scores

Just as in the case of item responses, where a low score indicated an unfavorable attitude and a high score a favorable attitude toward the issue presented, low total scores indicate unfavorable attitudes and high total scores indicate favorable attitudes toward the ideologies measured by the questionnaire scales. The specific categories of attitude defined by the various scale step intervals are presented in Fig. 2.




Fig. 2—The Differentiation of Attitudes from Total Scores

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The midpoint of the score range for each scale (a score of 39 for the C and D Scales and a score of 24 for the U Scale) was considered the point of absolute neutrality of attitudes. Such a score would be obtained by any respondent who checked response "3" for all items of a scale; response "3" is the "Undecided" or neutral response, indicating neither favorable nor unfavorable attitudes. A score indicating absolute neutrality could be obtained, of course, by any combination of item scores whose total was 39 for the C and D Scales and 24 for the U Scale.

In either direction from the point of neutrality, score limits were assigned on the basis of scale step intervals in order to define varying intensities of attitude. These limits are outlined below, using the C Scale as an example; the same system, however, applies to the remaining two scales, as can be seen from Fig. 2.

- (a) The area of neutral attitudes extends for one-half of a scale step ( $\frac{1}{2}$  of 13= 6.5) in either direction from the point of neutrality, i.e., from 32.5 to 45.5.
- (b) Extending one-half of a scale step further to the extremes of the score distribution are score areas indicating "favorable" and "unfavorable" attitudes from 26 to 32.5 being "unfavorable" and from 45.5 to 52 being "favorable."
- (c) At the very extremes of the score distribution are the remaining scale steps (13 to 26 and 52 to 65), designated as areas of attitudes of the greatest intensity, i.e., "anti" and "pro."


### Defining a Significant Difference in Attitude Scores

In comparing scores made by two groups on a given scale, it is necessary to establish a basis for defining a significant qualitative difference in attitudes. The definition of such differences is based here upon the scale step units described in the previous section. First, if a difference in scores reaches or exceeds a full scale step, i.e., if the difference in scores is 13 or more on the C and D Scales or 8 or more on the U Scale, such a difference is taken to be indicative of a significant qualitative difference in attitudes. Second, if a difference in scores is between one-half and one scale step in size, i.e., if the difference is from 6.5 to 13 points on the C and D Scales or from 4 to 8 points on the U Scale, such a difference is taken to be only suggestive of a qualitative difference in attitudes.


In order to illustrate these bases for differentiating attitude scores, the following example is presented, taken from data of this study.

In the March North Korean sample there were 668 prisoners who had no combat experience. The average score on the C Scale for this group is 39.53, or 0.04 scale step (0.53/ 13.00) above the neutral point (39.00). In the same sample, there were 46 prisoners with from 5 to 6 months of combat experience. Their mean score on the C Scale is 47.02, or 0.62 scale step (8.02/ 13.00) above neutrality. The difference between these two groups in terms of scale steps is 0.58, or slightly more than one-half the scale step. Such a difference is taken to be suggestive of a significant difference in attitudes between the two groups. These data are presented in the following graph.

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For similar subgroups (those with no combat experience and those with from 5 to 6 months of combat) in the September North Korean sample, the difference in mean C Scale scores is wider. The mean score for the no-combat group is 36.81 or -0.17 scale step (-2.19/13.00) below neutrality (39.00). For the 5 to 6 months combat group, the mean C Scale score is 51.78, or 0.98 above neutrality (12.78/13.00). The scale step difference between these two groups is 1.15, or more than a full scale step. Such a difference is taken to be clearly significant of a substantial qualitative difference in attitudes between the two groups. These data are graphically presented below.



## Analysis of Responses to Specific Items

The responses made by each sample to all items of the CDU Scales were analyzed in order to select those items, or issues, which appear to offer the most fruitful themes and messages to be used in future operations against CCF and NK forces. In general, this analysis might be considered as a rough type of pretest procedure for content, whereby the specific contents of future messages are selected by pretesting the attitudes of POW samples toward specific issues. The method utilized simply involves the computation of the average responses, or scores, made by each sample on every item, as well as the analysis of the response distributions. As an example, the responses made by the CCF-EM to the item, "The UN is the hope and salvation of humankind," follow:

Response	POWs, No.	POWs, %
Strongly Disagree (1)	8	1
Disagree (2)	33	5
Undecided (3)	70	10
Agree (4)	347	47
Strongly Agree (5)	275	37

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The average score attained by the CCF-EM for this item is 4.2, indicating that, as a group, they express more than agreement with the issue presented. Almost one-half of the respondents (47 percent) expressed agreement with this item, with 37 percent in strong agreement. These results suggest a possible "payoff" to be gained by using such an item in future messages. If, however, the average score on this item were 2.0 (Disagree) or 3.0 (Undecided), as was the case with many items, its use as a message would not be indicated.

Each item was examined in this way in order to select potentially useful themes.

### Reliability of the CDU Scales

The value of any measuring instrument must be judged, in large measure, by its reliability. The term "reliability," when used in the context of psychological measurement, refers to the consistency with which an instrument gauges the characteristics (in this case, attitudes) of those to whom it has been applied. A truly reliable test of attitudes, for example, would yield attitude scores that are stable, trustworthy, and relatively free from chance errors. How much confidence can be placed then in the scores achieved on the CDU Scales as being closely representative of the POWs' true attitudes toward communism, democracy, and the UN?

The reliability of each scale is expressed in terms of a reliability coefficient, representing, essentially, the degree of relationship of the test with itself. In other words, the coefficient, the value for which can range from -1.0 to +1.0, is a quantitative estimate of the similarity in response that could be expected in a retest with the same POWs under similar field conditions. Reliability coefficients for the CDU Scales are presented in Table 2.

TABLE 2  
RELIABILITY OF CDU SCALES

Scale	Chinese						North Koreans					
	Mar			Sep			Mar			Sep		
	EM	Os	Tot	EM	Os	Tot	EM	Os	Tot	EM	Os	Tot
C	.62	.63	.63	.64	.81	.70	.78	.87	.85	.87	.72	.92
D	.63	.57	.62	.59	.62	.67	.80	.83	.86	.78	.67	.87
U	.45	.60	.46	.57	.75	.66	.63	.65	.71	.64	.25	.73

The criteria for a sufficiently reliable test vary with the purposes to which scores derived from the tests will be put. For purposes of distinguishing reliably between average scores of given groups (as is the case here), a reliability coefficient of .50 to .60 is quite adequate. It will be noted from Table 2 that, in most instances, the reliability coefficients are well above .60, many of them even higher than .80. The few exceptions are for the U Scale, with reliabilities of .45, .46, and .25 found. It should be noted that the U Scale is the shortest

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of the three scales used, and that the reliability of a psychological scale is determined, in some measure, by its length, i.e., number of items. Thus, while the reliability of the U Scale is good for most of the samples studied, it could be improved by the inclusion of additional items. In general, however, the CDU Scales may be considered more than adequate in terms of their reliability for purposes of this investigation and others like it.

### Validity of the CDU Scales

The validity of a psychological test, or of any measuring instrument, depends upon the accuracy with which it measures whatever it purports to measure. In order to determine fully the validity of a test, or scale, it is necessary to utilize some external, objective measure, or criterion, against which the accuracy of the test is judged.

The problem of establishing the validity of attitude measures such as the CDU Scales in conditions of field investigation is an extremely difficult one. Obviously, there is no suitable, external criterion, e.g., enemy behavior, against which to judge the accuracy with which these scales measure attitudes toward communism, democracy, and the UN. In the absence of such an external measure, it is necessary to attack the problem internally, i.e., to analyze the results given by the use of the scales themselves in such a way as to give some clues as to their validity. This is the approach taken here to ensure the use of maximally valid instruments; the various steps taken in this direction are set forth below.

Item Analyses. After the administration of the CDU Questionnaire, items for each scale were analyzed in order to determine the degree to which they were able to discriminate between those POWs with high and low total scores, that is, those with very favorable and very unfavorable attitudes toward the ideology in question. The general technique used here for determining the internal validity of the scales is as follows. First, the total scores were computed for all respondents on all scales. Second, the 25 percent of respondents with the highest scores (most favorable attitudes) and the 25 percent with lowest scores (most unfavorable attitudes) on each scale were selected, and average scores on every item of the scales were computed for these groups. Third, the differences between the average item scores for the upper and lower groups were then examined in order to eliminate those items which did not discriminate between those with favorable and unfavorable attitudes. An example of a discriminating item and a nondiscriminating item is presented below:

Item	Av item score for upper 25% NK Group (Favorable)	Av item score for lower 25% NK Group (Unfavorable)	Diff.
1	4.86	1.50	3.36
11	3.61	2.59	1.02

The difference in average score attained on Item 1 for the upper and lower 25 percent groups is quite large, a difference of 3.36. In other words, the item itself is a valid one in that those 25 percent with the highest total scores have,

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on the average, very high scores on this item, and those 25 percent with lowest total scores have, on the average, very low scores on the item. For Item 11, the difference between the groups is barely more than the unit interval between response categories, a difference of 1.02. In other words, the score made on this item bears little relation to the scores attained on the C Scale as a whole. This item was therefore among those eliminated.

By this process, two items were eliminated from each scale (see Appendix B), leaving only those items which were most valid.

Purification of U Scale. Among the items of background data included in the questionnaire were those requesting the POWs to state the extent of their knowledge of the UN ("much," "some," "little," or "none"), and the sources of their knowledge ("radio," "newspapers," etc.). These data were utilized in order to omit from the analysis of the U Scale those POWs who did not have sufficient knowledge of the UN to enable them to respond to the items of this scale in a meaningful, or valid, way. This "purification" of the U Scale was accomplished by eliminating from the sample of the U Scale POWs who did not have "much" or "some" knowledge of the UN, and those who were unable to specify the sources of their knowledge. In this way, over 3000 POWs were eliminated from consideration in the analysis of attitudes toward the UN, thus assuring maximum validity of results for the U Scale.

Analysis of Relations among the Scales. Internal evidence as to the validity of psychological tests may often be obtained by analyzing the relations between the scores made by members of a given sample on two scales. For example, one would expect to find a positive relation between scores on an intelligence test and a test of reading comprehension in a sample of school children; on the other hand, one would expect to find a negative, or inverse, relation between motor dexterity and age in a sample of 16- and 60-year-olds. The examples cited are, obviously, extreme ones, but they serve to illustrate the type of question posed in this study. For each sample separately, the data were analyzed to determine the answer to the question: What is the relation between scores made on the C and D Scales; C and U Scales; and D and U Scales? If the scales were valid, high scores on the C Scale (favorable attitudes) should be associated with low scores on both the D and U Scales (unfavorable attitudes), and vice versa. Further, high scores on the D Scale should be associated with high scores on the U Scale. In order to test these relations, total scores among the three scales were intercorrelated separately for each sample. The resulting correlation coefficients are presented in Table 3.

It will be recalled that a correlation coefficient has a possible range of -1.0 to +1.0, and that its value is a quantitative representation of the interrelation between two sets of scores. Negative correlations indicate various degrees of inverse relation between two tests, or scales; a correlation near .00 indicates the absence of virtually any relation; positive correlations indicate various degrees of positive relation.

An examination of the correlations of Table 3 reveals that the correlations among the CDU Scales follow a consistent trend for all samples. The relation between the C Scale on the one hand, and the D and U Scales, on the other, is a highly negative one throughout, whereas the relation between the D and U Scales is consistently positive. In other words, the higher the prisoners'

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TABLE 3  
INTERCORRELATIONS<sup>a</sup> OF C, D, AND U SCALES  
FOR CCF AND NK SAMPLES

Scales	CCF-Mar			NK-Mar			CCF-Sep			NK-Sep		
	O	EM	Tot	O	EM	Tot	O	EM	Tot	O	EM	Tot
C-D	-.66	-.62	-.75	-.76	-.78	-.87	-.71	-.53	-.59	-.30	-.75	-.69
C-U	-.71	-.64	-.83	-.85	-.77	-.83	-.61	-.47	-.43	-.59	-.78	-.60
D-U	-.61	.76	.21	.81	.89	.90	.77	.75	.79	.54	.88	.94

<sup>a</sup>All of the correlations are significant at the <.01 level of confidence, i.e., for each correlation there is less than 1 chance in 100 that the relationship is one which occurred by chance alone.

scores on the C Scale (favorable to communism), the lower their scores on both the D and U Scales (unfavorable to democracy and the UN); in addition, high scores on the D Scale were found to be associated with high scores on the U Scale. The findings apply equally to the March and September samples.

Logically, it would be expected that these relations should obtain, i.e., that those prisoners who express pro-communist attitudes would also express anti-democratic and anti-UN attitudes, and vice versa. Similarly, it is logical to assume that those prisoners who are favorable to the UN would also hold favorable attitudes toward democracy. Thus, the finding is not, of itself, a surprising or startling one. However, the clear substantiation of these logical hypotheses on the basis of the scale intercorrelations represents striking and substantial evidence that the questionnaire utilized in this investigation is one of considerable internal validity, and one which is capable of differentiating among the attitudes held by prisoners of war.

Comparison of Findings with Those of Other Studies. This study, as noted earlier, represents one of a series of ORO research efforts designed to study psychological vulnerabilities of enemy (CCF and NK) forces. Since each of these studies deals with different attitudes, it is not to be expected that the results of the studies should parallel each other, and, indeed, such is not the case. Throughout these studies, however, one finding has been repeated consistently, that the NK-Os, as a group, represent a hard-core unit of uniformly high morale, with strongly pro-communist ideological orientation. In the present study this finding is again clearly substantiated, as will be reported in subsequent sections of the report; this type of repeated evidence in a given direction strongly suggests the validity of the instruments utilized.

Comparison of Results of March and September. While certain isolated differences between the findings of March and September will be reported and discussed subsequently, it should be pointed out here that, in general, the results are strikingly similar for the two groups of samples. This similarity in response from independent samples drawn from among POWs represents additional evidence of the validity of the CDU Scales.

Comparison of Surrender and Capture Groups. The attitudes of those POWs who had surrendered and those who were captured were analyzed separately. In the case of each sample, the capturees expressed attitudes more

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favorable to communism and less favorable to democracy and the UN than those who surrendered. This finding lends added weight to the validity of the scales.

Procedural Precautions. In the administration of attitude scales to POWs, the most valid instruments may yield invalid data due to defensiveness and untruthful responses, and to illiteracy. In the administration of the questionnaire steps were taken to prevent these sources of error. One precaution was to assure prisoners that their responses were to remain anonymous and that neither preferential nor punitive treatment could possibly result from truthful responses to the items. Also, each item of the scales was read aloud in order to enable the POWs who were illiterate to make meaningful responses.

There is, obviously, no method whereby the success of these precautions, as such, may be demonstrated. However, all of the indirect, internal evidences of the validity of the scale outlined above certainly support the conclusion that the CDU Scales yield meaningful and apparently valid estimates of attitude among POW samples. Nevertheless, it is recognized that with each reapplication of psychological measures the opportunity to perfect validity is present. Therefore, future applications of these scales should include additional tests of validity.

### ANALYSIS OF ATTITUDES

#### Between Samples

A general description of the score distributions for the three scales is given in Fig. 3. (See Appendix C for frequency distributions of total scores.) Presented there are smoothed frequency curves indicating the percentage of respondents in each sample attaining a given score on each scale. It should be kept in mind that the scoring system was such that the higher scores always represent favorableness or "pro-ness" of attitudes (toward communism, democracy, and the UN), and that lower scores represent unfavorableness or "anti-ness" of attitudes.

Considering first the distributions for the C Scale, it is seen from Fig. 4 that the scores for the NK-Os are distributed heavily towards the higher end of the scale (in both March and September), indicating strongly pro-communist attitudes. This description of the NK-O group parallels the findings of earlier studies in which the NK-Os were found to represent a hard-core group of uniformly high morale and of strongly pro-communist ideological orientation. The remaining three samples distribute themselves more evenly along the scale continuum. The differences among them are not very great, although it can be seen that the distributions are arranged, in general, in the following order in both March and September: CCF-O: the bulk of the sample was toward the lower (anti-communist) end of the scale; CCF-EM: distribution shifted slightly more towards the middle of scale; NK-EM: distribution approaches statistical normality, with bulk of respondents in the middle portion of the scale.

The distributions for the D and U Scales follow a pattern similar to that for the C Scale except that, as expected, the directions are reversed. Here the NK-Os fall primarily toward the lower ends of the scales, indicating attitudes strongly unfavorable to these two systems; the NK-EM are distributed, again

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


Fig. 3—Distribution of Total Scores for CDU Scales

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primarily in the middle portions of the scales; the CCF-EM are somewhat higher, and the CCF-Os still higher. Again, the results show a high degree of consistency between the March and September groups.

### Between Scales

Figure 4 presents the mean scores attained on each of the three scales by both the March and September samples. Although essentially the same data are presented in the frequency distributions of Fig. 3, they are presented here in order to contrast the average scores graphically for the three scales.




Fig. 4—Average Scores for CDU Scales

In the case of each sample (in both March and September), it will be noted that the largest differences exist between the C Scale on the one hand and the D and U Scales on the other. The contrast is clearest for the NK-O group, for whom the average score on the C Scale indicates strongly pro-communist attitudes, and the averages for the D and U Scales indicate unfavorable attitudes toward democracy and the UN. For the remaining samples, the direction of difference is reversed, most clearly for the CCF-O group, whose mean scores indicate attitudes favorable to democracy and the UN, and unfavorable to communism.

### Between March and September

The results obtained in March and September are, in general, strikingly similar with respect to all samples. For only one scale does a difference of significant magnitude appear; in the case of the North Korean EM, attitudes toward the UN are significantly more favorable among the September sample than among those interviewed in March. It is impossible to ascribe this change to any given factor or factors with any degree of certainty. Nevertheless, pos-

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sible explanations for this change will be set forth in subsequent sections of the report, dealing with the relation of attitude scores and background variables.

## Relation of Attitudes and Background Characteristics of the Samples

**Time in Army.** The relation between CDU attitudes and length of army service among the North Koreans (O and EM) follows the pattern indicated in Fig. 5. For both the March and September NK samples, increasingly pro-communist and anti-democratic and UN attitudes are found for those with longer time in the army. The differences in average scores between the 0- to 4-month and over 24-month groups are significantly large for each scale; the new troops hold neutral attitudes toward the three ideologies studied, while the veteran troops are strongly pro-communist and anti-democratic and UN. These differences are probably a reflection of the intensive indoctrination program conducted by the Communist leaders of the NK armies, a program which evidently influences sharply the attitudes of those troops subjected to it for a considerable time. It should be noted that these results apply hardly at all to the NK officers, whose attitudes are strongly pro-communist irrespective of length of service. The Chinese samples also give little evidence of attitude change with length of time in the army, probably because of their role as professional soldiers, in contrast to the conscript status of the NK-EM. It would seem, in the light of these findings, that psywar, whose mission it is to influence the ideological orientation of the enemy, would find its greatest success among NK-EM who are relatively new recruits.




Fig. 5—Attitudes of NK POWs with Varying Time in Army

**Length of Training.** Differences in attitudes as a function of length of training are described in Fig. 6 for the NK samples. The results parallel those found for the length of army service, i.e., increasingly pro-communist and anti-

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democratic and UN attitudes with increasing length of training. The similarity in results is not surprising in view of the fact that with longer army service, the NK soldier has been exposed to longer periods of communist indoctrination, or training. It is also to be expected that the NK-Os, already found to be strongly pro-communist, are those with predominantly longer training periods than the EM.




Fig. 6—Attitudes of NK POWs with Varying Training Periods

**Time in Combat.** Figure 7 presents a description of differences in CDU attitudes for NK POWs when studied in terms of combat time. Considering first the C Scale, it is apparent that those POWs with longer periods of combat expressed increasingly more favorable attitudes toward communism up to a point (5 to 6 months combat experience), following which there is a return to less favorable or neutral attitudes. This type of curvilinear relation is also found for the D and U Scales, here, however, in the opposite direction, i.e., less favorable attitudes toward democracy and the UN with increasing amounts of combat until 5 to 6 months, following which there is a return to neutral attitudes.

These trends may be explained in terms of a saturation point which is reached in prolonged combat experience. In general, it appears as if combat experience serves to strengthen group identification and attitudes unfavorable to democracy and the UN cause. However, after 5 to 6 months, the soldier becomes saturated, "fed up" with combat, and at this point, instead of feeling increasing hatred for the enemy and loyalty to his own cause, his attitudes are reversed, and he gives up his strong group identification. It appears, therefore, that those segments of the enemy NK forces with very long periods of combat, as well as those with no combat experience at all would be most amenable to indoctrination.

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The foregoing results apply more to the NK-EM than to the NK-Os and not at all to the CCF groups. The relative homogeneity of response among the NK-Os, without regard to combat experience, is to be expected in view of the description of this group given earlier. The Chinese forces, made up predominantly of professional soldiers, are also little influenced in their attitudes by the length of time they have spent in combat.




Fig. 7—Attitudes of NK POWs with Varying Combat Time

**Degree of Knowledge of UN.** In studying differences in attitudes among prisoners with various degrees of knowledge of the UN, it was necessary to omit the U Scale itself from consideration since the elimination of those respondents with little or no knowledge of the UN rendered the samples for this scale too small for worthwhile analysis. Analyses of the C and D Scales in relation to UN knowledge are presented in Figs. 8 and 9. Among the Chinese officers, no differences in attitudes toward democracy and communism are found for groups with varying degrees of knowledge of the UN; among the Chinese enlisted men, especially in March, attitudes toward communism become increasingly less favorable with increased knowledge of the UN, while attitudes toward democracy become more favorable (see Fig. 8). Among the North Koreans, the contrast in results for the enlisted men in March and September is worth noting. In March, both the NK-Os and EM show a trend toward an increase in pro-communist and anti-democratic attitudes with increased knowledge of the UN; this trend is minimal for the NK-EM, but nevertheless apparent. In September, a reversal takes place. While the results for the NK-Os remain virtually the same (if anything, more strongly pro-communist), the enlisted men show increasingly unfavorable attitudes towards communism and increasingly favorable attitudes toward democracy with increased knowledge of the UN. This finding is graphically presented in Fig. 9. Although no

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direct evidence can be presented to explain this change, it may be hypothesized that for the September samples knowledge of the UN had come increasingly from UN sources, thus counteracting the "knowledge of the UN" learned in communist indoctrination. This is somewhat borne out by the finding that




Fig. 8—Attitudes of Chinese POWs with Varying Degrees of Knowledge of UN




Fig. 9—Attitudes of NK POWs with Varying Degrees of Knowledge of UN

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those NK-EM who name their source of knowledge of the UN as lectures or school had more favorable attitudes toward communism than others. In any case, it is clear that knowledge of the UN itself does not mean a weakening of attitudes toward communism; it depends upon the nature of knowledge and where and from whom it is received. From the results of this study, it would seem possible that a reorientation of attitudes toward communism and democracy among NK-EM could be effected through UN propaganda offering knowledge of the UN.

Education. An analysis of CDU attitudes in terms of the level of education of the respondents reveals a striking contrast between the North Korean and Chinese samples. This is shown in Fig. 10. Among the Chinese in both March




Fig. 10—Attitudes of POWs with Varying Degrees of Education

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and September, those with longer periods of education express attitudes more favorable toward democracy and the UN, and more unfavorable toward communism; among the North Koreans, the opposite obtains, i.e., increased education is found to be related to more favorable attitudes toward communism and unfavorable attitudes toward democracy and the UN. These findings may be interpreted in a number of ways. It seems most likely, however, that education among the North Koreans has in it some strong elements of communist indoctrination, while the education of the CCF forces encountered in Korea may have been relatively free from such influences. In addition, a positive correlation is to be expected between degree of education and rank, the hard-core NK officers being those with the higher degree of education.

Surrender-Capture Status. Differences in attitudes between capturees and surrenderers are presented separately for officer and EM samples in Fig. 11.




Fig. 11—Attitudes of POWs Who Surrendered and Were Captured



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The differences are in the expected direction, i.e., within all samples, capturees are more favorable to communism and more unfavorable to democracy and the UN than are surrenderers. The largest differences are found for the NK samples, especially among the enlisted men.

Length of Imprisonment. No consistent differences in CDU attitudes are found for POWs differing in length of imprisonment. (The only exception is for the NK-EM of September for whom a sharp increase in pro-communist and anti-UN and democratic attitudes appear after the first month of imprisonment.) The over-all picture presented by the data indicates that the prisoners did not change their ideological orientation substantially irrespective of the length of time they spent in UN hands; this is to be expected in view of the fact that no prisoners were included in the samples who were subjected to extensive indoctrination influences.

### Analysis of Background of Anti-Communist NK-Os

As noted earlier, the NK-Os as a whole were found to be a hard-core group with strongly pro-communist and anti-democratic and UN attitudes. A very small percentage of these prisoners (4 to 5 percent), however, were atypical in that their questionnaire scores indicated anti-communist and pro-democratic and UN attitudes. The following question arises with respect to this small group: Are they different from the bulk of the NK-Os in any discernible way, i.e., in terms of their backgrounds, do the few, "soft-core," NK-Os differ from the large majority of hard-core NK-Os?

In order to answer this question, the background data for the small percentage of anti-communist NK-Os were analyzed separately and compared with the background data of the sample taken as a whole. In only one respect were they found to differ, i. e., in the branch of service from which they came. The few NK-Os whose attitudes were anti-communist were found to have come predominantly from noncombat units, e.g., transportation, signal, medical, etc. In contrast, the NK-O sample as a whole is made up predominantly of prisoners who came from combat units, e.g., infantry and artillery. While these results do not appear to be definitive enough to mark a consistent trend, it would seem to be logical that the most hard-bitten communists would be placed in front-line units marked for combat. In any case, the NK-Os warrant intensive study as a group typical of hard-core, pro-communist groups in order that whatever vulnerabilities they do have might be exposed.

### Attitudes toward Specific Issues

Those questionnaire items yielding the most clearly favorable responses in UN terms (i.e., most favorable to the UN and democracy and most unfavorable to communism) are presented below for each sample.

For the CCF officers and enlisted men:

- (a) The UN is the hope and salvation of humankind.
- (b) The American type of democracy is the best form of government ever devised.
- (c) Since the American type of democracy respects the will of the majority, it gives great happiness to its people.

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- (d) In the American type of democracy, everyone can enjoy freedom of speech.
- (e) The working class in a communist state leads a miserable slave life.

For the North Korean enlisted men:

- (a) The UN is the hope and salvation of humankind.
- (b) The UN is the only organization capable of checking aggression.
- (c) Since the American type of democracy respects the will of the majority, it gives great happiness to its people.
- (d) In the American type of democracy, everyone can enjoy freedom of speech.
- (e) The American type of democracy is devoted to the peaceful settlement of all world problems.




Fig. 12—Responses of NK and CCF POWs to Item: "The Working Class in a Communist State Leads a Miserable Slave Life"

As expected, the NK-Os responses to all items of the questionnaire are, on the average, uniformly favorable to issues dealing with communism, and unfavorable to those dealing with democracy and the UN. The contrast in responses between the NK-Os and the remaining samples for one item is described in Fig. 12. It will be noted that over 60 percent of the NK-Os in March and over 80 percent in September "strongly disagreed" with the item posed, i.e., that "the working class in a communist state leads a miserable life"; this is in sharp contrast to the responses of the remaining samples. Essentially the same picture is repeated for all items of the questionnaire.

The items listed above under each sample group should be considered as offering potentially useful themes to be stressed in future messages directed at those targets to which they pertain. This does not mean that the statements (items) as given in the questionnaire should be lifted in their entirety for in-

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corporation as messages. The items selected in this fashion should serve only as indicators or suggestions for themes about which variations can be written; they can, in other words, serve as idea-nuclei for thematic materials whose purpose it is to affect the ideological orientation of specific target groups.

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## Appendix A

### BACKGROUND OF SAMPLES

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TABLE A1  
AGE

Years	Chinese						North Korean									
	March			September			March			September						
	Os (73)		EM (735)	Os (230)	EM (881)	Os (329)	EM (964)	Os (530)	EM (1359)							
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%						
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%						
16-20	5	6.8	87	11.8	-	-	7	0.8	25	7.6	255	26.5	34	6.4	365	26.9
21-25	23	31.5	256	34.8	12	5.2	125	14.2	172	52.3	290	30.1	268	50.6	424	31.2
26-30	32	43.8	230	31.3	98	42.6	328	37.2	93	28.3	180	18.7	172	32.5	291	21.4
31-35	6	8.2	101	13.7	70	30.0	251	28.5	18	5.5	145	15.0	39	7.4	194	14.3
36-40	5	6.8	42	5.7	21	9.1	123	14.0	7	2.1	71	7.4	10	1.9	73	5.4
41-45	2	2.7	12	1.6	15	6.5	33	3.7	2	.6	8	0.8	2	0.4	5	0.4
45+	-	-	4	.5	1	.4	1	0.1	1	.3	9	0.9	3	0.5	3	0.2
NA	-	-	3	.4	13	5.7	13	1.5	11	3.3	6	0.6	2	0.4	4	0.3

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TABLE A2  
AMOUNT OF EDUCATION

Years	Chinese						North Korean					
	March			September			March			September		
	Os	(73)		Os	(230)		Os	(329)		Os	(530)	
	No.	%	No.	No.	%	No.	No.	%	No.	No.	%	No.
None	23	31.5	408	55.5	3	1.3	449	51.0	11	3.3	311	32.3
1-3	18	24.7	178	24.2	25	10.9	280	31.8	17	5.2	151	15.7
4-6	16	22.0	93	12.7	55	23.9	87	9.9	127	38.6	295	30.6
7-9	7	9.6	30	4.1	52	22.6	32	3.6	49	14.9	139	14.4
10-12	8	11.0	13	1.8	58	25.2	4	0.5	88	26.7	58	6.0
Over 12	1	1.4	5	0.7	21	9.1	2	0.2	26	7.9	5	0.5
NA	-	-	8	1.1	16	7.0	27	3.1	11	3.3	5	0.5
											16	3.0
											34	26.8
											37	7.0
											276	20.3
											433	31.9
											165	12.1
											69	5.1
											16	0.1
											56	4.1

TABLE A3  
SURRENDER-CAPTURE DATA

Status	Chinese						North Korean					
	March			September			March			September		
	Os	(73)		Os	(230)		Os	(328)		Os	(530)	
	No.	%	No.	No.	%	No.	No.	%	No.	No.	%	No.
Capturee	37	50.6	395	54.0	88	38.3	323	36.7	298	91.0	575	60.0
Surrenderer	36	49.4	339	46.0	118	51.3	535	61.0	17	5.2	377	39.1
NA	-	-	1	-	24	10.4	23	2.6	14	4.3	12	1.2
											114	21.5
											90	6.6
											414	30.5
											3.4	855
											62.9	

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TABLE A4  
MILITARY SERVICE  
Part A: Time in Army

Months	Chinese						North Korean					
	March			September			March			September		
	Os (73)		EM (735)	Os (230)		EM (881)	Os (329)		EM (964)	Os (530)		EM (1359)
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
0-4			8	1.1	16	7.0	132	15.0	700	72.6	222	41.9
5-8	1	1.4	6	0.8	16	7.0	280	31.8	160	16.6	61	11.5
9-12	4	5.5	28	3.8	21	9.1	75	8.5	65	6.7	53	10.0
13-16	1	1.4	20	2.7	13	5.7	43	4.9	14	1.5	32	6.0
17-20	2	2.7	16	2.2	4	1.7	16	1.8	7	.7	32	6.0
21-24	-	-	17	2.3	18	7.8	27	3.1	4	.4	27	5.1
24+	65	89.0	632	86.0	127	55.2	283	32.1	3	.3	85	16.0
NA	-	-	8	1.1	15	6.5	25	2.8	11	1.1	18	3.4
											25	1.8

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TABLE A4  
MILITARY SERVICE  
Part B: Length of Training

Months	Chinese						North Korean					
	March			September			March			September		
	Os (73)		EM (735)	Os (230)		EM (881)	Os (329)		EM (964)	Os (530)		EM (1359)
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
0-3	4	5.5	345	47.0	54	23.5	530	60.2	164	49.8	861	89.3
4-6	3	4.1	169	23.0	48	21.0	110	12.5	40	12.2	51	5.3
7-9	3	4.1	73	10.0	15	6.5	40	4.5	13	4.0	13	1.3
10-12	3	4.1	47	6.4	16	7.0	19	2.2	23	7.0	8	0.8
Over 12	60	82.2	82	11.2	67	29.1	90	10.2	65	20.0	12	1.2
NA	-	-	19	2.6	30	13.0	92	10.4	24	7.3	19	2.0
											78	14.7
											1153	84.8
											242	45.7
											60	11.3
											34	6.4
											34	6.4
											82	15.5
											78	14.7
											128	9.4

Part C: Time in Combat

Months	Chinese						North Korean					
	March			September			March			September		
	Os (73)		EM (735)	Os (230)		EM (881)	Os (329)		EM (964)	Os (530)		EM (1359)
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
None	5	6.8	27	3.7	10	4.3	211	24.0	144	43.8	513	53.2
1-2	16	21.9	138	18.8	110	47.8	499	56.6	71	21.6	290	30.1
3-4	34	46.6	388	52.8	39	17.0	56	6.4	45	13.7	75	7.8
5-6	18	24.7	159	21.6	14	6.1	25	2.8	13	4.0	33	3.4
7-8	-	-	7	1.0	11	4.8	9	1.0	4	1.2	22	2.3
9-10	-	-	2	0.3	30	13.0	51	5.8	3	0.9	12	1.2
NA	-	-	14	2.0	16	7.0	30	3.4	49	14.9	19	2.0
											114	21.5
											72	5.3
											186	35.1
											144	27.2
											55	10.4
											15	2.8
											3	0.6
											5	0.4
											12	2.5
											4	0.3
											72	5.3

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TABLE A4  
MILITARY SERVICE  
Part D: Rank

Status	Chinese						Status	North Korean						
	March			September				March			September			
	Os (73)		EM (735)	Os (230)		EM (881)		Os (329)		EM (964)	Os (53 <sup>a</sup> )		EM (1359)	
	N	%	N	%	N	%		N	%	N	%	N	%	
	N	%	N	%	N	%		N	%	N	%	N	%	
Pvt	593 80.7						Pvt	908 94.1						1319 97.1
Unit Ldr	29 3.9						Cpl	39 4.0						29 2.2
Sub Sq														
Ldr	51 6.9						Sgt	8 0.8						9
Sq Ldr	62 8.4						Sr Sgt	8 0.8						2
Sub Plat														
Ldr	29	39.7		54	23.5		Jr Lt	230	69.9		406	76.6		
Plat Ldr	36	49.3		124	53.9		Lt	59	17.9		69	13.0		
Co Ldr	6	8.2		35	15.2		Capt	20	6.1		50	9.4		
Btn Ldr	2	2.7		17	7.4		Maj	9	2.7		3	0.6		
							Col	11	3.3		2	0.4		

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TABLE A5  
INFORMATION ON THE UN  
Part A: Knowledge of the UN

Answers	Chinese						North Korean					
	March			September			March			September		
	Os (73)		EM (735)	Os (230)		EM (881)	Os (329)		EM (964)	Os (530)		EM (1359)
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Yes	73	100	553	75.2	200	87.0	288	87.5	763	79.1	319	60.2
No	-	-	175	23.8	13	5.7	27	8.2	192	20.0	81	15.3
NA	-	-	7	1.0	17	7.4	14	4.3	9	0.9	130	24.5
Part B: Source of Knowledge												
Radio	18	24.7	189	25.7	26	11.3	266	30.2	8	2.4	61	6.3
Lect. or school	4	5.5	100	13.6	12	5.2	26	3.0	24	7.3	170	17.6
Other	9	12.3	187	25.4	25	10.9	144	16.3	7	2.1	128	13.3
people											15	2.8
Mag,	42	57.5	106	14.4	61	26.5	136	15.4	90	27.4	96	10.0
books,											-	-
news-											291	21.4
papers												
NA	-	-	153	20.8	106	46.1	309	38.5	200	60.8	509	52.8
											297	56.0
											641	47.2
Part C: Extent of Knowledge												
Much	12	16.4	59	8.0	45	19.6	98	11.1	50	15.2	43	4.5
Some	21	28.8	151	20.5	105	45.7	194	22.0	95	28.9	195	20.2
Little	32	43.8	254	34.6	47	20.4	228	25.9	131	40.0	316	32.8
None	8	11.0	244	33.2	10	4.3	320	36.3	36	11.0	368	38.2
NA	-	-	27	3.7	23	10.0	41	4.7	17	5.2	42	4.4
											92	17.4
											90	6.6

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TABLE A6  
LENGTH OF IMPRISONMENT

Chinese - March					Chinese - September				
Months	Os (73)		EM (735)		Months	Os (230)		EM (881)	
	No.	%	No.	%		No.	%	No.	%
5-6	5	6.8	58	7.9	5-6	3	1.3	21	2.3
3-5	7	9.6	36	4.9	3-5	10	4.4	8	.9
2-3	29	39.7	195	26.5	2-3	199	86.5	120	13.6
1-2	30	41.1	399	54.3	1-2	2	0.9	722	81.9
1 or less	3	4.1	39	1.1	1 or less	16	7.0	10	1.1

North Korean - March					North Korean - September				
Months	Os (329)		EM (964)		Months	Os (530)		EM (1359)	
	No.	%	No.	%		No.	%	No.	%
9-10	1	0.3	3	0.3	10 or more	276	52.1	888	65.3
8-9	9	2.7	14	1.5	9-10	115	21.7	43	3.2
7-8	30	9.1	87	9.0	8-9	8	1.5	16	1.2
6-7	119	36.2	327	33.9	7-8	9	1.7	13	1.0
5-6	113	34.3	237	24.6	6-7	11	2.1	3	0.2
4-5	17	5.2	39	4.0	5-6	17	3.2	2	0.1
3-4	8	2.4	23	2.4	4-5	1	0.2	1	
2-3	2	0.6	33	3.4	3-4	6	1.1	3	0.2
1-2	6	1.8	55	5.7	2-3	2	0.4	2	0.1
1 or less	3	0.9	5	0.5	1-2	1	0.2	10	0.7
NA	21	6.3	136	14.1	NA	84	15.8	378	27.8

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Appendix B

**THE CDU AND BACKGROUND DATA QUESTIONNAIRES**

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## INTRODUCTORY REMARKS AND INSTRUCTIONS

(To be read by supervisor)

The statements presented on the following pages represent typical opinions held on a variety of topics by many people throughout the world. Until now, we, as scientists interested in studying the opinions of people, have had no opportunity of finding out how Chinese (North Koreans) feel about these matters. You, as Chinese (North Korean) prisoners of war, represent a first opportunity for us to study these matters. We, therefore, sincerely hope that you will cooperate with us by filling in this questionnaire conscientiously and honestly.

Before proceeding to fill in this questionnaire, we would like to present a few suggestions which would be helpful to you.

1. Please do not print or sign your name, address, or former military organization to any part of this questionnaire. **SINCE YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED TO GIVE ANY INFORMATION THAT CAN BE USED TO IDENTIFY YOU, WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL NOT HESITATE TO ANSWER HONESTLY AND FRANKLY. WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT YOUR ANSWERING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE WILL IN NO MANNER AFFECT YOUR TREATMENT HERE AS A PRISONER OF WAR.**
2. As mentioned previously, the statements used in this questionnaire represent the opinion of many people; that is, on a given statement, there are people who believe that it is true, there are others who believe the statement to be false, and there are still others who hold no opinion about the matter at all. **IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD, THEREFORE, THAT THERE ARE NO RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS TO ANY OF THE STATEMENTS YOU WILL FIND IN THIS QUESTIONNAIRE. YOU SHOULD ANSWER EACH OF THE STATEMENTS ACCORDING TO YOUR OPINION OR BELIEF: REMEMBER, THERE ARE NO RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS!**
3. For purposes of scientific analysis, it is necessary that each respondent make sure that he answers all of the statements included in the questionnaire. **WHEN YOU HAVE FINISHED FILLING IN THE QUESTIONNAIRE, KINDLY CHECK YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE FORM TO MAKE SURE THAT YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL OF THE ITEMS.**
4. On the next two (2) pages you will find a series of questions about yourself, the answers to which will be very helpful in scientifically analyzing your answers to the statements.  
**WE WOULD LIKE TO REMIND YOU AGAIN THAT NONE OF THIS INFORMATION ABOUT YOURSELF CAN BE USED TO IDENTIFY YOU: YOU MAY THEREFORE ANSWER THE ITEMS FRANKLY AND HONESTLY.**

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## INSTRUCTIONS ON MARKING THE ANSWERS

(To be read and demonstrated by supervisor)

You will find to the right of each statement in the questionnaire a series of five (5) squares; these squares have been placed to the right of each of the items so as to provide for five (5) possible answers. The five (5) possible answers are given to the top of the first item on Page 1 of the questionnaire. These are STRONGLY AGREE, AGREE, UNDECIDED, DISAGREE, AND STRONGLY DISAGREE. Each of these possible answer categories expresses a different shade of opinion, ranging from feeling very strongly in favor to feeling very strongly against what the statement says. For those who have no opinion or who cannot make up their mind as to how they feel about a given item, the answer category of "Undecided" has been provided.

Now, you are required to select and mark with an "X" the square of that answer category which best describes your feeling or opinion about that particular statement. LET YOUR OWN PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OR FEELING DETERMINE YOUR ANSWER. YOU WILL MARK ONLY ONE ANSWER FOR EACH STATEMENT.

To illustrate the manner in which you are to mark your answers, the following demonstration is given. The statement used in this example is not included in the questionnaire.

### DEMONSTRATION

"All men are born free and equal" ( ) (X) ( ) ( ) ( )

In the case of this sample statement, an "X" has been placed in the "AGREE" answer category. This means that any person who marks this answer category feels that the statement is true. It should be remembered, however, that other respondents might mark a different answer category in response to this item. Thus, some might have just disagreed with it, others might have strongly agreed with the item, and still others might not have any opinion at all.

If you have any difficulty in answering any of the items, do not hesitate to call upon the supervisor for help.

## QUESTIONNAIRE

*Reproduced below is the complete questionnaire as administered to the POW samples.*

### Background Data

1. AGE: 15-20 ( ); 21-25 ( ); 26-30 ( ); 31-35 ( ); 36-40 ( );  
41-45 ( ); Over 45 ( ).
2. RANK:  
North Korean: Private ( )  
Cpl ( ); Sgt ( ); Sr Sgt ( ).  
Jr Lt ( ); Lt ( ); Capt ( ); Major ( );  
Col ( ); Sr Col ( ).

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Chinese: Private ( )  
Unit Ldr ( ) ; Sub-sqd Ldr ( ) ; Sqd Ldr ( ) ;  
Sub-pl Ldr ( ) ; Pl Ldr ( ) ; Co Ldr ( ) ;  
Bn Ldr ( ) ; Rgt Ldr ( ) ; Div Ldr ( ) .

**3. MILITARY SERVICE:**

- A. Total time in army (in months): 0-4 ( ) ; 5-8 ( ) ; 9-12 ( ) ; 13-15 ( ) ;  
17-20 ( ) ; 21-24 ( ) .  
B. Length of training (in months): 0-3 ( ) ; 4-6 ( ) ; 7-9 ( ) ; 10-12 ( ) ;  
Over 12 ( ) .  
C. Time in combat (in months): None ( ) ; 1-2 ( ) ; 3-4 ( ) ; 5-6 ( ) ; 7-8 ( ) ;  
9-10 ( ) .

**4. MARITAL STATUS:**

Married ( ) ; Single ( ) .

**5. EDUCATION (in years):**

None ( ) ; 1-3 ( ) ; 4-6 ( ) ; 7-9 ( ) ; 10-12 ( ) ; Over 12 ( ) .

**6. CIVILIAN OCCUPATION:**

Farmer ( ) ; Fisherman ( ) ; Miner ( ) ; Businessman ( ) ; Public Official ( ) ;  
Student ( ) ; Professional (e.g., Lawyer, Doctor, Educator, Pharmacist,  
etc.) ( ) .

**7. RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE:**

None ( ) ; Buddhist ( ) ; Taoist ( ) ; Chondokyo ( ) ; Christian ( ) ;  
Mohammedan ( ) ; Confucianist ( ) .

**8. BRANCH OF MILITARY SERVICE:**

Infantry ( ) ; Artillery ( ) ; Tank Corps ( ) ; Transportation ( ) ;  
Ordnance ( ) ; Air Corps ( ) ; Quartermaster ( ) ; Political Propaganda  
Section ( ) ; Medical ( ) .

**9. PARTY OR ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP:**

North Korean: Labor Party ( ) ; Democratic Party ( ) ; Democratic Youth  
League ( ) ; Chondokyo Party ( ) ; Kuminhoo ( ) ;  
Kuomintang ( ) ; Socialist Party (Sahootang) ( ) .  
Chinese: Communist Party ( ) ; Democratic Youth League ( ) ;  
Kuomintang Party ( ) .

**10. PARTY OR ORGANIZATION PARTICIPATION:**

If the respondent has not been an actual member of any of the above-  
listed parties, but has participated in their activities in any manner,  
kindly indicate this fact by placing the symbol 0 next to the appropriate  
party listed in Item 9 above.

**11. KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS ACTIVITIES:**

- A. Has the respondent ever heard about the United Nations?

YES ( ) NO ( )

- B. Can the respondent estimate the extent of his knowledge about the  
United Nations?

MUCH ( ) SOME ( ) LITTLE ( ) NONE ( )

- C. From what source did the respondent obtain his information about the  
United Nations?

Newspapers ( ) ; Radio ( ) ; Lectures or School ( ) ;  
Magazines, Books, etc. ( ) ; From other people ( ) .

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## 12. CIRCUMSTANCES OF BECOMING A PRISONER OF WAR:

- A. Captured ( ); Surrendered ( ). ( )
- B. Date of Capture-Surrender: ( )
- North Korean: 25 June 1950 - 15 July 1950 ( )
- 16 July 1950 - 20 August 1950 ( )
- 21 August 1950 - 20 September 1950 ( )
- 21 September 1950 - 15 October 1950 ( )
- 16 October 1950 - 15 November 1950 ( )
- 16 November 1950 - 25 November 1950 ( )
- 26 November 1950 - 20 January 1951 ( )
- 21 January 1951 - 10 February 1951 ( )
- 11 February 1951 - 15 March 1951 ( )
- 16 March 1951 - PRESENT ( )
- Chinese: 15 November 1950 - 25 November 1950 ( )
- 26 November 1950 - 20 January 1951 ( )
- 21 January 1951 - 10 February 1951 ( )
- 11 February 1951 - 15 March 1951 ( )
- 16 March 1951 - 15 April 1951 ( )
- 16 April 1951 - 15 May 1951 ( )
- 16 May 1951 - 15 June 1951 ( )
- 16 June 1951 - PRESENT ( )

### CDU Questionnaire \*

- |          |                                                                                                                                           |
|----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Item No. |                                                                                                                                           |
| U-1      | In order to prevent aggression and to maintain world peace, the United Nations should be further reinforced.                              |
| C-1      | Communism is an unnatural idea which dictates against the dignity of man.                                                                 |
| D-1      | The American type of Democracy is the best form of government ever devised.                                                               |
| C-2      | Communism is the realization of the hopes of all mankind.                                                                                 |
| DI-1     | All problems of human society can be solved without war.                                                                                  |
| U-2      | The United Nations is the hope and salvation of mankind.                                                                                  |
| C-3      | Communism is an interim form of government eventually leading to an ideal social order.                                                   |
| D-2      | Since the American type of Democracy respects the will of the majority, it gives great happiness of its people.                           |
| DI-2     | War cannot break out if the standards of living of the people in the world are equally improved.                                          |
| U-3      | The United Nations interference in the Korean conflict is harmful to the ultimate unification and peaceful settlement of Korean problems. |
| D-3      | American democracy is another name for capitalism.                                                                                        |
| DI-3     | As long as human beings exist, war is inevitable.                                                                                         |
| C-4      | The working class in a communistic state lead a miserable slave life.                                                                     |

\*C--Communism Scale; D--Democracy Scale; U--United Nations Scale; DI--dummy item.

The following items were eliminated from the data analysis: For the NK-Mar sample: C-3, C-11, U-1, U-6, D-5, and D-8; for the NK-Sep sample: C-3, C-11, U-6, U-10, D-5, and D-8; for the CCF-Mar sample: C-3, C-13, U-1, U-6, D-10, and D-15; for the CCF-Sep sample: C-3, C-13, U-6, U-9, D-10, and D-15.



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U-4 United Nations action in the present Korean conflict clearly indicates that it, The United Nations, is a tool of the capitalistic nations.

D-4 American democracy is better than communism in every way.

DI-4 It is good to have a war for the progress of society.

U-5 The United Nations participation in the Korean conflict is downright interference in Korean internal affairs.

D-5 The American type of Democracy may be all right for the American people, but inadequate to the needs of other nations.

C-5 Since Communism denies the basic rights of man, it therefore tends to retard the progress of man.

U-6 The United Nations is an organization out to end Communism.

DI-5 It is all right to use an atomic bomb on an aggressor.

U-7 The United Nations is a powerless international organization.

D-6 The American type of Democracy is a wasteful and inefficient form of government.

C-6 Communism resorts mainly to ruthless means to achieve its aims.

C-7 Communism is the best form of government.

U-8 The United Nations is the only organization capable of checking aggression.

C-8 Communism cannot offer anything toward pro-higher living standards for its people.

D-7 In the American type of Democracy, everyone can enjoy freedom of speech.

U-9 The United Nations should be reorganized so as to consist of democratic nations only.

D-8 The American type of Democracy functions best in time of peace and prosperity, but is inadequate in time of stress.

DI-6 An atomic bomb should not be used regardless of reasons.

C-9 Communism is the true Democracy.

D-9 Unemployment flourishes best in the American type of Democracy.

DI-7 The current Korean war will bring nothing good, only the loss of innocent lives.

C-10 As long as communistic states exist, the peace and security of the world cannot be maintained.

D-10 American Democracy is opposed to all forms of imperialistic and autocratic government.

U-10 The United Nations is a camp of reactionary nations.

DI-8 The current war is very necessary.

D-11 The ideals of the American type of Democracy can never be realized.

C-11 Communism is a base materialistic form of government.

D-12 American democracy benefits the capitalists but not the working class.

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DI-9	This war started when the ROK Army invaded North Korea.
C-12	Communists talk about the welfare of the working masses, but they are liars.
DI-10	A war is an essential factor for the progress of human society.
C-13	Communism has no regard for the right of the individual.
D-13	Although majority opinion prevails in the American Democracy, it is more often than not without rationality.
D-14	American Democracy consists in an ideology of aggression.
D-15	The American type of democratic nations are devoted to the peaceful settlement of all world problems.
C-14	Communism as we know it is nothing more than an unrighteous dictatorial form of government.
C-15	There can be no ideology other than communism that can give happiness to the proletariat.

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Appendix

DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES

ORO-T-42(FEC)

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TABLE C1  
DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL SCORES

Scores	Communism Scale							
	CCF				NK			
	March		September		March		September	
	Os (73)	EM (735)	Os (217)	EM (875)	Os (318)	EM (959)	Os (477)	EM (1301)
12-15	0	9	17	27	1	16	2	106
16-19	0	25	27	36	2	36	0	98
20-23	0	0	35	64	1	30	1	106
24-27	3	9	0	143	1	93	1	125
28-31	21	12	38	0	5	111	1	154
32-35	15	24	29	148	0	123	6	128
36-39	14	148	24	149	6	0	0	168
40-43	9	113	21	148	15	193	0	0
44-47	9	82	10	76	20	135	15	129
48-51	1	54	8	38	22	84	22	83
52-55	1	19	4	24	23	50	37	70
56-59	0	9	3	11	49	33	45	59
60-63	0	0	1	5	43	21	75	33
64-65	0	1	0	3	63	25	134	24
	0	0	0	3	67	9	132	18
Mean	31.71	33.67	27.43	32.02	54.41	36.96	53.72	33.10
Sigma	6.23	8.00	9.35	9.00	10.18	10.49	8.18	12.54
Democracy Scale								
12-15	0	0	0	1	38	6	116	11
16-19	0	0	0	1	37	11	102	12
20-23	0	0	0	3	41	18	78	36
24-27	0	1	2	12	54	36	55	45
28-31	0	23	0	47	49	54	42	60
32-35	1	56	3	64	28	86	35	99
36-39	8	140	20	143	38	169	30	187
40-43	19	146	37	176	21	237	7	189
44-47	17	145	23	154	3	131	3	155
48-51	15	98	55	110	4	116	1	152
52-55	9	70	38	90	4	46	1	120
56-59	3	34	26	53	0	25	0	68
60-63	1	14	13	21	1	20	1	79
64-65	0	8	0	0	0	14	0	76
Mean	46.04	44.04	45.02	40.51	27.21	41.33	20.41	42.95
Sigma	5.76	7.39	7.11	8.24	9.52	5.11	8.85	11.58

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TABLE C1 (continued)

UN Scale

Scores	CCF				K			
	March		September		March		September	
	Os (33)	EM (201)	Os (145)	EM (275)	Os (145)	EM (236)	Os (160)	EM (295)
8-11	0	0	0	0	31	5	19	2
12-15	0	0	0	3	33	13	46	6
16-19	0		1	6	37	35	40	19
20-23	1	25	7	40	23	47	29	30
24-27	8	53	15	88	16	48	18	41
28-31	13	56	39	5	2	40	4	51
32-35	11	44	38	40	1	39	3	52
36-39	0	15	34	31	3	17	0	40
40-43	0	5	11	12	0		1	34
Mean	29.60	28.97	32.18	28.38	17.24	20.00	16.44	20.50
Sigma	3.28	4.98	4.96	5.76	6.23	5.00	5.86	6.00